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A lender seeking to help its borrower in distress ha more to worry about than simply whether 
its loan security is good enough to permit such generosity. If there are junior lenders in the 
background (underground?), the senior lender’s indulgences can lead to changed priorities, 
punishing rather than rewarding the senior lender’s intended altruism. 
Lennar Northeast Partners v Buice (1996) 49 CA4th 1576, 57 CR2d 435, reported at 20 CEB 
RPLR 45 (Jan. 1997), is a good illustration. Buice Trust purchased a $935,000 loan secured by 
an existing first deed of trust that was currently in default. Buice agreed to extend the note’s due 
date for another year and to increase the note amount by $140,000 (to cover some past and future 
interest) in return for an increase in the interest rate from 9 percent to 12 percent. (I am 
oversimplifying the transaction, and ignoring a good many other facts.) Lennar Partners, holders 
of a subordinated note and deed of trust on the same property, took the view that as a result of 
this transaction they were now first rather than second in seniority, because they never consented 
to the changes. Lennar relied on the general rule that a senior lender’s agreement to “material” 
loan modifications without a junior lienholder’s consent may result in a loss of the senior 
lender’s priority over the junior, based on the rationale that the unconsented-to modification 
might increase the risk of the borrower’s default or impair the junior’s security (e.g., by 
substantially increasing the borrower’s burdens under the modified loan). 2 California Real 
Property Financing §1.21 (Cal CEB 1989). (Except in the case of a nonconsenting subordinating 
seller, until Lennar, the case law was unclear about whether the senior’s entire original loan or 
just the unconsented-to modified portion would lose priority.) 
Two trial court judges agreed with Lennar and elevat d Lennar’s lien entirely over Buice’s 
lien. The court of appeal, however, held that Buice’s modifications cost it only partial, not total, 
loss of priority: the $140,000 modifications dropped to third place, but the original $935,000 was 
still first. Although, technically, Buice was the prevailing party, this was a meager victory: that 
final $140,000 is not likely to get paid. (Why fight unless there is not enough security to go 
around?) 
So future Buices have to be careful if they want to stay senior. No one else is going to watch 
out for them. The debtor doesn’t care, because she’s going to owe the money regardless of who 
wins. And junior lenders would just love to see thesenior lender foul up, because it can only 
improve their relative positions (unless the juniors themselves are unwitting seniors, i.e., they 
know they are junior to A, but do not realize they are also senior to C, and therefore in need of 
the same cautionary advice). So here is advice for lenders to follow when asked to change the 
terms of a loan. 
Double-Check the Future Advance Clause 
Most deeds of trust contain some kind of future advance clause—a clause providing that any 
future extension of credit by the lender will also be secured by the existing deed of trust. 
California Mortgage and Deed of Trust Practice §8.38 (2d ed Cal CEB 1990). With the future 
advance clause, the lender has the advantage that the priority of the future credit extension will 
relate back to the date of the original deed of trust. 
When a modification is requested, you cannot go back and rewrite the original deed of trust, 
but you can review it to see what kind of future advance clause it contains. Some old clauses 
(called “dragnet” or “anaconda” clauses) are worded so broadly that any new transaction can fit 
under it; lenders don’t commonly use these types of clauses anymore because they are difficult to 
enforce. See Mortgage and Deed of Trust §8.34. Newer clauses generally have some limitations 
on what new loans come under the old deed of trust, often requiring at a minimum some 
paperwork linkage between the transactions. If the new advance doesn’t comply with the 
conditions in the future advance clause, the lender loses the advantage of having priority relate 
back to the date of the original deed of trust. Theresult is that, despite any language in the new 
note stating that it is secured by the old deed of trust, the lender must conduct a new title search 
to look for juniors, because any new money lent will take priority only as of the date the new 
loan was made. 
Alternatively, if the new advance does fit within the parameters of the future advance clause in 
the old deed of trust, a title search is unnecessary because California law protects the priority of 
future advances made by the advancing lienholder unless that lienholder has received actual 
notice of intervening liens. Mortgage and Deed of Trust §8.38. The burden is on the junior 
lienholder to notify the senior of her existence, rather than on the senior to search for juniors 
each time the borrower requests another advance. 
It is likely that the junior will in fact notify you of the existence of her lien, because it is both 
imperative, as suggested above, and simple to do so. (After all, a junior learns about a senior 
when she gets a title search incidental to making her own loan; because she also usually records 
a request for notice of default of the senior loan, it isn’t much more effort for her to send a letter 
notifying the senior of her existence). Thus, your client likely will know about the junior. Once 
your client actually knows about the junior, the effectiveness of an optional future advance 
clause is markedly reduced. Any such advance is secured, but as a third, not a first. All the future 
advance clause does in this case is to avoid the need for executing another deed of trust; it does 
not help on priority. Your client should not make such an advance unless the client would have 
been willing to take a third deed of trust on the property at the outset. (Attorneys should also 
admonish their clients to save the notification letters they get from juniors so that the client can 
negotiate with the junior when modifications are contemplated.) 
Is There a Subordination Agreement? 
A future advance made without a junior’s consent gets third priority after the junior’s second 
lien, but at least the old first stays first. The situation can be even worse when the original 
priorities resulted from a subordination agreement rather than by time and order of recording. A 
junior who agrees to subordinate to a senior on certain conditions subordinates only if those 
conditions are met: a party who has agreed to subordinate her deed of trust to a $1 million loan 
may not be subordinate to a loan of $1.1 million instead. This straightforward contract logic can 
generate harsh results—total rather than partial reversal of priorities. That’s understandable when 
the subordinating loan never complied; but what if he subordinating loan failed to comply 
because, while the senior’s deed of trust permitted a future advance, the junior’s subordination 
agreement did not (e.g., the senior loan was for the permitted $1 million and was later enlarged 
because of a $100,000 further advance)? If the extra $100,000 given to help out the borrower 
will reduce the priority of the entire $1 million previously advanced, you can be sure that a 
lender won’t agree to advance the new money. 
Lennar’s Contribution 
Lennar’s contribution to this issue is to apply future advnce principles rather than 
subordination logic to loan workouts, and to preserve the senior’s original loan priority, even 
when the lender who modifies the loan knows there is a subordinated junior. Under Lennar, total 
reversal of priorities occurs only in special cases (e.g., when, according to the Lennar court, the 
subordinated party is a seller; I think, however, a better case can be made for applying the total 
priority reversal in transactions involving a “hard money” lender like Lennar if its note is subject 
to CCP §580b (antideficiency prohibition for purchase money loans), because the lender would 
lose real money if a senior’s foreclosure extinguished its lien). In summary, it’s still somewhat 
risky to bail out your borrower, but it’s not catastrophic. 
Safer Alternatives 
Lennar suggests less risky ways to aid distressed borrowes. Regardless of whether your 
senior lienholder client knows about a junior, or whether the junior subordinated or just appeared 
later, the client can simply agree to postpone payment of the loan. Postponement is not regarded 
as a material modification harmful to a junior, and therefore can be done without junior consent. 
49 CA4th at 1584. Your client can agree to give the debtor breathing room without endangering 
his or her priority. 
In a tantalizing but little-examined aspect of Lennar, the senior claimed (unsuccessfully) that it 
was doing just that for its debtor. Buice asserted that most of the additional $140,000 advanced 
represented delinquent back interest and prepaid future interest, rather than a transfer of funds to 
the debtor. The court didn’t buy it, but suppose it were true? 
If a senior can safely permit the borrower not to pay on time, it can also safely permit the 
interest to accrue, surely with the same priority as the unpaid principal. Buice got in trouble not 
for letting the interest accrue, but for capitalizing the interest, which made it look like a future 
advance or modification, with an attendant loss of priority. It may be legitimate to forego interest 
payments, but not to take a new note for them! 
Does that mean that your client must give up the opportunity to compound the back interest 
and to charge a higher interest on the entire loan? Yes, but not entirely. Why not make the 
foregone compounding and foregone interest rate increase the principal of a new note—
admittedly in third position, but nevertheless secur d—thereby leaving the original note and 
original interest intact and in first position (just as a lender holding a first deed of trust can make 
a subsequent loan secured by a third deed of trust on the property without the consent of the 
holder of the second deed of trust)? It’s not perfect, but it doesn’t make things worse and it may 
be better than foreclosure. (Of course, whether you can sue as a sold out junior on your third note 
after you have foreclosed yourself out through a senior sale is an entirely separate question; see 
discussion of cases in Mortgage and Deed of Trust §4.32.) 
